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“To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the
usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”1

INTRODUCTION
Research in multiple disciplines has established that the role of litigation
and courts in the creation and implementation of public policy in the
United States has grown dramatically.2 Central to this revolution were (1)
an outpouring of rights-creating federal statutes, many of which contained
attorney’s fees or damages provisions that were designed to stimulate
private enforcement,3 and (2) the modern class action, born around the time
when Congress began ramping up statutory private enforcement regimes.
Although the consequences and normative implications of this
revolution have been the focus of intense debate,4 scholars have neglected
systematic examination of the counterrevolution against private
enforcement that ensued. Our recent work seeks to fill this gap in the
literature by assessing the counterrevolution from an institutional
perspective. In a series of articles5 and a book,6 we document how the
Executive Branch, Congress and the Supreme Court—wielding both
judicial power under Article III of the Constitution and delegated

1 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
2 See generally CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION
STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1994); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).
3 See FARHANG, supra note 2.
4 See generally ANDREW P. MORRISS, BRUCE YANDLE, & ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION
BY LITIGATION (2008); REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002);
REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW (Daniel P.
Kessler ed., 2011); see also Francis Fukuyama, The Decay of American Political Institutions, AM. INT.

(Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/12/08/the-decay-of-americanpolitical-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/NMA5-K6MX] (“The courts and legislature have
increasingly usurped many of the proper functions of the executive, making the operation of the
government as a whole both incoherent and inefficient.”).
5 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559 (2015) [hereinafter Rulemaking]; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014) [hereinafter
Litigation Reform]; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, The Subterranean Counterrevolution: The
Supreme Court, the Media, and Litigation Retrenchment, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 293 (2015) [hereinafter
Subterranean Counterrevolution]. In another paper, we focus on the implications of our data for the
study of litigation retrenchment in civil rights cases. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Reforming
Civil Rights Litigation: Why the Court Succeeded Where Congress Failed, in THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
REVISITED (Linda Dodd ed., 2017).
6 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017).
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legislative power under the Rules Enabling Act7—have fared in efforts to
reverse or dull the effects of statutory and other incentives for private
enforcement.8 In this Article we focus specifically on class actions, situating
their consideration in the framework, and fortifying it with data, that we
have developed as part of that project.
In our work addressing the larger phenomenon, we find that the
counterrevolution became essentially a partisan project beginning with the
first Reagan Administration.9 Recognizing the political infeasibility of
retrenching substantive rights, the movement’s strategy was to undermine
the infrastructure for enforcing them. We show that the project was
undertaken in earnest but largely failed in the elected branches, where
efforts to diminish opportunities and incentives for private enforcement by
amending federal statutory law were substantially frustrated.10 We also show
that, although Chief Justices appointed by Republican presidents have
hoped to bring about major retrenchment through amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, success has proved elusive and episodic,
despite appointments that caused the Advisory Committee to be dominated
by Republican-appointed judges and practitioners representing business.11
We then document the sharply contrasting success of the counterrevolution
in the federal judiciary.12 Over the past four decades, incrementally at first
but more boldly in recent years, the Supreme Court has transformed federal

28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2012).
The phenomenon of Congress including private enforcement regimes, whether attorney’s
fee-shifting provisions or multiple damages provisions (or both), in statutes enacted to confer new
or expand old rights, increased substantially in the late 1960s and the 1970s, and it is closely
correlated with the enormous increase in federal civil filings that started in the late 1960s. See
Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1548 (“Figure 1 supports our claim that the growth in private
litigation enforcing federal statues is a function of statutory design.”).
9 For a discussion of early Reagan Administration efforts to retrench private enforcement, see
id. at 1551-55; BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 25-65.
10 Id.; see also Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1562-67 (“The legislative project of litigation
reform mounted by the Republican Party was largely a failure.”).
11 See Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1588-1603 (“[Chief Justice] Burger’s appointments of
judges to the Advisory Committee markedly favored judges appointed by Republican Presidents,
reinforcing our judgment that he sought to use appointments to influence the development of civil
rules.”); Rulemaking, supra note 5, at 1591 (“The balance of power on the Committee between judges
appointed by Republican versus Democratic presidents, which was three to two during the 1987-90
period, tilted yet more sharply in favor of Republican appointees starting in 1991-92.”); see also
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 65-129.
12 See id. at 130-91; Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1605 (“[A] one-judge majority of the Supreme
Court—whose members are unelected, serve for life, and are insulated from individual if not
institutional reprisal—can bring about momentous civil litigation reform that would be impossible to
secure from the legislature or its delegated procedural lawmaking bodies.” (footnote omitted)).
7
8
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law from friendly to unfriendly, if not hostile, to the enforcement of rights
through private lawsuits.13
We offer an institutional account of why conservative judges on a court
exercising judicial power succeeded where their ideological compatriots in
Congress, the White House, and the primary rulemaking committee largely
failed. In doing so, we emphasize distinctive institutional properties of the
judiciary. First, the Court is governed by a streamlined decisional process
and simple voting rules, making it capable of unilateral action on
controversial issues. Second, life-tenured federal judges are largely
insulated from the forces and incentives of democratic politics, providing
the Court with considerable freedom to act decisively on divisive issues.
Third, in eras of divided government and party polarization, the Court faces
less credible threats of statutory override, thus enjoying more policymaking
discretion. Fourth, the law governing or driving private enforcement,
perceived by most observers as legalistic and technical, provides the Court
with a pathway to retrenchment that, as we demonstrate empirically, is
remote from public view. This subterranean quality is reinforced by the
slow-moving, evolutionary nature of case-by-case policy change.14
We focus here on one particular instrument of private enforcement, but
we do so in the light of our broader research. We begin with a sketch of the
modern class action. We then consider how attempts to curb its enforcement
potential have fared in the elected branches, at the hands of those who
brought it forth—the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules—and, finally, in
the decisions of the Supreme Court. We conclude that institutional patterns in
class actions largely track the story we discern in our larger project: the Supreme
Court has been the most successful institutional agent in retrenching law that
governs or influences private enforcement. In other words, it is not just “the
usefulness of Rule 23” that conservative Justices have been “bent on
diminishing,”15 but the usefulness of statutory provisions and other legal rules
that promote private enforcement in general.
13 The focus of our work is “the substance of law rather than its effects. We have not sought to
measure the extent to which lawmakers have actually succeeded in affecting the incidence or
qualitative impact of private enforcement of federal rights. Such an undertaking would require
another book, and that book might not succeed, for the measurement challenges are monumental.”
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 226. We also understand that our focus exclusively on
decisions of the Supreme Court may distort the extent of judicially created legal change (or stasis),
but we have yet to see systematic data that support that view.
14 See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 192-247; see also Litigation Reform, supra
note 5, at 1580-82; Subterranean Counterrevolution, supra note 5, at 299-300 (“Although significant
legislative or rulemaking reform proposals often present stark alternatives that trigger powerful interest
group mobilization, the case-by-case, less visible, more evolutionary process of legal change via court
decisions on seemingly technical and legalistic issues is far less likely to do so.” (footnote omitted)).
15 Supra text accompanying note 1.
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I. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were drafted by an
advisory committee appointed by the Supreme Court. In 1934, the Court
was authorized to prescribe “general rules” of practice and procedure for
the federal courts under a statute delegating federal legislative power.16
Previously, federal class actions had been permitted in a limited set of
circumstances based on the practice of courts of equity in England.17 The
class action rule that the Court promulgated in 1938 divided the world of
group litigation into three parts, which came to be called “true,” “hybrid,”
and “spurious” class actions.18 The classification turned on an analysis of the
abstract nature of the rights involved that often verged on the
metaphysical.19 For this and other reasons, class actions did not play a major
role in federal litigation from 1938, when the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure became effective, until 1966.
In that year, amendments to the Federal Rules became effective that
initiated a sea change in the use of group litigation. The Advisory
Committee’s stated agenda in revising Rule 23 was largely uncontroversial.20
In connection with the rule on class actions, as with other joinder rules, they
sought to turn federal jurisprudence from abstract inquiry to functional
analysis that considers the practical as well as the formal legal effects of
litigation.21 To that end, in Rule 23(a) they specified four requirements
applicable to all litigation if it was to proceed as a class action—colloquially
referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of

16 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–
74 (2012)). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
17 See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION 8-36 (1987); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An
Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998).
18 See Hazard, Jr., Gedid & Sowle, supra note 17, at 1938.
19 See id.; Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities
of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 53-54 (2010).
20 The stated goals of the Advisory Committee can be found in the Advisory Committee Note
that accompanied the 1966 amendments. Benjamin Kaplan, the Reporter, elaborated his views of those
goals in articles published after the amendments became effective. See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, A
Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (discussing “dual missions of the classaction device” to reduce duplicative litigation and provide a means of vindicating small claims that
could not be individually brought); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1966). In addition to these
sources, this account draws on our reading of records of the committee’s deliberations, and on the recent
work of David Marcus, which is consistent with our reading. See David Marcus, The History of the
Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 599 (2013).
21 See id. at 605 (“Other than desegregation, no substantive concern surfaced in committee
deliberations.”).
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representation.22 But in Rule 23(b), they also reformulated the categories
appropriate for class action treatment and specified different procedural
requirements depending on the category.
It was the third category (Rule 23(b)(3)) that marked the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 as a notable break from the past. Here, a court may
certify a case as a class action if it finds that “the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.” If the court does so certify, Rule 23 requires that notice be
given to the members of the class and that they thereby be given an
opportunity to opt out of the action, avoiding its preclusive effects.23
Although the Advisory Committee could not have foreseen all of the
effects of their handiwork in Rule 23(b)(3),24 they recognized that this
provision would enable some claimants for whom individual litigation
would be economically irrational (those with “negative value claims”) to
band together in group litigation against a common adversary. Contrary to
the view espoused by the Supreme Court25 (and many commentators),
however, this was not the Advisory Committee’s main purpose in 23(b)(3).26
The Court’s interpretation is difficult to square with the Advisory
Committee Note, which foregrounds the goal of “achiev[ing] economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promot[ing] uniformity of decision as to
persons similarly situated.”27 Class actions packaging negative value claims
create litigation; they do not make existing or prospective litigation more

22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”).
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
24 See Marcus, supra note 20, at 608 (“Class actions were a litigation backwater when they began
work, but they seemed to have some sense that their obscure rule would assume far greater
importance going forward.” (footnote omitted)).
25 See Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“While the text of Rule 23(b)(3)
does not exclude from certification cases in which individual damages run high, the Advisory
Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights of groups of people who individually
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.’”) (quoting Kaplan, A
Prefatory Note, supra note 20, at 497).
26 David Marcus and John Coffee reached the same conclusion. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 61-63 (2015); Marcus, supra note
20, at 599-600, 605-06 (“To a significant extent, they tackled class action reform primarily to correct
technical flaws and bring a badly shopworn procedural rule in line with caselaw developments. These
were adjectival objectives that had no obvious regulatory or redistributive valence.”).
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
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efficient or consistent.28 The Court’s interpretation is even more difficult
to square with Rule 23(c)(2)’s requirement that individual notice be given to
members of (b)(3) classes who can be identified with reasonable effort. For most
people with small claims, notice and an opportunity to opt out are hardly
important, while paying for notice may present insuperable financial obstacles
for those representing the class.29 Finally, the record of the Committee’s
deliberations does not support the Court’s assertion in Amchem.30
Through the addition of Rule 23(b)(3) for cases seeking monetary relief,
the 1966 amendments greatly expanded the territory in which the common
fund exception to the American Rule could operate. Moreover, amended
Rule 23 immediately overlaid pre-1966 statutory private enforcement
regimes and became part of the background against which subsequent
regimes were constructed. Inserted into a legal landscape that had
previously known them only in the wings, class actions soon occupied center
stage, functioning as a kind of private enforcement “wild card . . . divorced
from the statutes and administrative regulations that are the authorized
sources of regulatory policy.”31

28 The only reference to small claims in the section of the Note explaining (b)(3) came toward
the end. In discussing the interest of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits (one of the factors
pertinent to predominance and superiority), the Committee observed that such interest may be
“theoretic rather than practical . . . [because] the amounts at stake for individuals may be so small
that separate suits would be impracticable.”
29 These aspects of the revised rule were added late in the drafting process to meet concerns
that the subdivision might be used by defendants, in league with class counsel, to bind those with
large individual claims through group litigation “inimical to their interests.” Stephen B. Burbank,
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1439, 1488 (2008); see also Marcus, supra note 20, at 605 (noting concerns put forth by committee
member John Frank that Rule 23 could result in collusive settlement negotiations and “give
defendants classwide preclusion at an unjust discount”).
30 The Amchem Court relied heavily on Kaplan’s articles. The small-claims class action loomed
larger among Kaplan’s goals than it did among those of the Advisory Committee as a whole.
Moreover, it only became prominent in his remarks to the Committee late in the process of
developing the rule, when the argument that (b)(3) was the “small man’s rule” was useful in response
to repeated efforts by Advisory Committee member John Frank to delete the entire subsection. See
Minutes of the May 1965 Meeting of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 14 (May 15-17, 1965), in
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURES, microformed on CI-8002-83 (Cong. Info. Serv.). Indeed, at the meetings in late
October/early November, 1963, Kaplan was still describing (b)(3) primarily as a vehicle for antitrust
and fraud claims. See Transcript of Meeting of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 4 (Oct. 31-Nov.
2, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, microformed on CI-7104-53 (Cong. Info. Serv.). Shortly thereafter,
Judge Wyzanski remarked that “one aspect which isn’t emphasized . . . is the claim of a particular
individual which is very small and unlikely to be litigated.” Id. at 7. We are grateful for insight on
this subject to J. Taylor Gooch, Penn Law Class of 2013.
31 Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 637, 660 (2013).
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As evidenced by the legislative responses to amended Rule 23 in the
1970s that we discuss in Section III,32 it did not take long to recognize that
the small-claims class action presents a difficult public policy dilemma. On
one view, that dilemma is how to provide sufficient access to court in a
society that relies heavily on private litigation for the enforcement of
important legal norms, while ensuring fidelity to those norms and the
regulatory policies underlying them, avoiding unfairness to defendants and
others affected by litigation, and respecting the limited capacity of the
courts. The puzzle is that this dilemma was not apparent to the group that
drafted the amendments or the other bodies that considered them before
they became effective.
One possible explanation, already suggested by our discussion of Rule
23(b)(3), is that, far from being pre-occupied with negative value claims,
the Committee did not give them adequate attention. That would have
required considering the costs as well as the benefits of animating them.
Another explanation is that the Committee did not anticipate developments
in substantive law, statutory private enforcement regimes, and the legal
profession that catalyzed the economic incentives of the class action.33
Still another possible explanation for the Advisory Committee’s failure
to engage with this and other public policy dilemmas presented by the
modern class action lies in the process they followed in fashioning the 1966
amendments. Had that process been more inclusive and transparent, tradeoffs that became obvious soon after the amendments came into effect might
have received adequate attention. Instead, a pamphlet containing all
proposed amendments that were to become effective in 1966—a group far
larger than the proposed amendments to Rule 23—was “widely distributed
to the bench, bar and law schools in March 1964,” apparently by mail.34
There were no hearings. The Committee received very few written

See infra text accompanying notes 68–99.
See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
“Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670-76 (1979) (summarizing numerous factors,
unrelated to Rule 23, leading to the class action boom); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
34 Letter from Warren Olney III, Dir., Admin. Office of the Courts, to the Supreme Court
(Oct. 8, 1965), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, microformed on CI-6406-02 (Cong. Info. Serv.). We found no
evidence that the proposals that became the 1966 amendments were published. In 1981, the Standing
Committee considered various possible changes to the rulemaking process. One of the items
considered was whether “the circulation and distribution of proposed rules amendments [was]
adequate and [whether] the process [should] be further opened to public scrutiny.” Comm. on Rules
of Practice & Procedure, Minutes of the Meeting of June 18-19, 1981 1 (Aug. 28, 1981),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST06-1981-min.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
YN9D-RC5P]. During the discussion a member of the committee “suggested that the distribution
of proposed amendments was one of the weakest parts of the system.” Id. at 4.
32
33
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comments on the entire package of proposed amendments,35 and of those
addressing Rule 23 proposals, a majority concerned Rule 23.1 (derivative
actions). The Reporters tended to treat the few critical comments
(“brickbats”) about the Rule 23 proposal as naïve, ill-informed, or perhaps
immoral,36 which might have been more difficult if the process had included
more participants, or if the critics had been permitted to engage in the giveand-take of a public hearing.
The last suggestion speaks to the epistemic foundations of the 1966
amendments and, more generally, to whether they represented good public
policy. We do not intend a critique founded in democratic values. When the
1960s Advisory Committee was at work on Rule 23, it was not yet clear that
the landscape of federal civil litigation was undergoing a profound
transformation that would soon fill federal courts with private lawsuits
brought as a result of conscious legislative choices to stimulate private
enforcement of federal law. Those choices led to the birth of the
counterrevolution in the first Reagan Administration. It was not until the
political and ideological valence of private enforcement became apparent that
questions about democratic values in rulemaking, presaged in debates about
the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, became obvious and insistent. It was
this democratic deficit, in part, to which the 1980s reforms of the Rules
Enabling Act process were addressed, seeking to make rulemaking more
open, accessible, and susceptible to congressional oversight.37

35 A list of “Communications Received on March 1964 Draft of Amendments to Civil Rules”
appears in the Committee’s papers in the “Deskbook” that contains the agenda for the May 1965
meetings. It lists twenty-seven “communications” (comments), together with the comments of two bar
associations previously distributed. RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, microformed on CI-6402-65 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
In a letter to the Reporter, Charles Alan Wright expressed surprise “that these proposals have
elicited so little comment from the profession” and noted that he was “disappointed by the quality
of the comments which you did receive.” Letter from Charles Alan Wright, Professor, Univ. of Tex.
Sch. of Law, to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. 1 (Apr. 24, 1965), in RECORDS OF
THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES,
microformed on CI-7005-28 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
36 The Reporters distributed a memorandum to the Committee “discussing the brickbats
received.” Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan & Albert Sacks to the Advisory Comm. on Civil
Rules (Apr. 21, 1965), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, microformed on CI-7005-10 (Cong. Info. Serv.). In
response to the criticism that (b)(3) should require opting in, rather than permit opting out, the
Reporters observed that “[t]he morality of treating such people [“small people with small claims”]
as null quantities is very questionable. For them the class action serves something like the function
of an administrative proceeding where scattered individual interests are represented by the
government.” Id. at EE-3.
37 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 65-129, 217-48.
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II. THE RESPONSE OF THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS
In an environment of proliferating regulatory statutes and greater
competition within the legal profession, the potential of the 1966
amendments to enable attorneys to do well by doing good (or, depending on
one’s perspective, to enrich themselves) was quickly realized, as was the
potential of the (b)(3) class action to promote inefficient overenforcement of
substantive law. This problem surfaced quickly and dramatically in litigation
under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), a complex regulatory statute
enacted in 1968 that promotes private enforcement by authorizing minimum
and maximum statutory damages and attorney’s fees (in addition to actual
damages, if any, which are difficult to prove).38
Although such provisions make sense as part of a private enforcement
regime to induce individual litigation, minimum statutory damages can lead
to devastating liability for technical statutory violations in a class action.39
Troubled by this evident misfit, some federal district courts refused to certify
(b)(3) class actions in TILA litigation,40 prompting Congress to cap the
statutory damages recoverable in a class suit at the lesser of one percent of
the creditor’s net worth and, first (in 1974), $100,000,41 then a few years later
(in 1976), $500,000.42 Indeed, of the eight bills to reduce the opportunities or
38

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67f (2012). For the provisions on individual and class damages, see id.,

§1640.
39 See Comment, Truth in Lending and the Federal Class Action, 22 VILL. L. REV. 418, 423 (1977)
(“The legislative history of the TIL Act makes no mention of the class action; apparently, the
drafters simply failed to consider it.” (footnote omitted)).
40 See, e.g., Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Tr. Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying (b)(3)
class certification for lack of superiority as an adjudicative method, while exercising “considerable
discretion,” because a technical TILA violation would result in a “horrendous, possibly annihilating
punishment” for defendants). “Between February 14, 1972, the date of the Ratner decision, and
November 29, 1972 . . . the courts denied twenty-one class actions alleging Truth in Lending violations
while allowing only two.” Note, Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410, 1412
(1974); see also Marcus, supra note 20, at 630 (“The lower federal courts overwhelmingly refused to
certify TILA classes and thereby weakened the statute’s regulatory value.”). For problems that ensued
even after Congress capped the damages available in a TILA class action, some of which derived from
the possibility that the cap might lead to a smaller recovery by class members than they could obtain in
individual actions, see Comment, supra note 39, at 447-48.
41 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. IV, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1500, 1518.
42 See Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4, 90 Stat. 257, 260. In 1980,
Congress also made the cap applicable to a series of class actions arising out of the same failure to
comply by the same creditor. See Act of Mar. 31, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 615(a)(1), 94 Stat. 132, 180.
In 2010, it raised the cap to the lesser of $1,000,000 or one percent of net worth. See Act of July 21, 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, § 1416(a)(2), 124 Stat. 2107, 2153. Although Congress has addressed the
problem of potential overenforcement under some other statutes, it has not done so consistently, which
illustrates one of the costs of a transsubstantive class action regime and prompted the description of
the (b)(3) class action as a “wild card.” Supra text accompanying note 31; see also Stephen B. Burbank,
Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1930
(2006) (“Although the concept of inefficient overenforcement is a tool of economic analysis of law,
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incentives for class actions that were introduced in Congress from 1973 (when
the Library of Congress bill database starts)43 to 1980, four were targeted at
this specific problem.44 Another bill would have made class actions
unavailable in cases asserting claims valued at less than ten dollars,45
suggesting that interest extended beyond the phenomenon of
overenforcement to the very concept of using class litigation to vindicate
small claims, prevent unjust enrichment, or deter illegal conduct.
The existence of such interest on the part of the Executive Branch was
made clear in ambitious proposed legislation developed by the Office for
Improvements in the Administration of Justice in the Carter Administration’s
Department of Justice. In August 1978 Senator DeConcini (for himself and
Senator Kennedy) introduced this proposed legislation as S. 3475.46 The
accompanying commentary prepared by the Justice Department sets out the
case for a legislative approach, observing that “revision of class damage
procedures should be accomplished by direct legislative enactment rather
than through the rule-making process,” because “deterrence of widespread
injury is of substantial public interest, and Congress should devote extensive
consideration to any proposal.”47 The commentary also argued that, because
such revision “would have significant economic ramifications,” there were
“serious questions as to whether [it] is appropriately within the scope of the
rule-making authority granted by the Rules Enabling Act.”48
The proposed legislation would have repealed Rule 23(b)(3), replaced the
small-claims class action with a public action (brought by or on behalf of the
when applied to a particular statute, it surely must start with the level of enforcement sought by the
legislature . . . .” (footnote omitted)). For a list of statutes in which Congress has limited remedies
available in class actions, see Brief for Respondent at Appendix A, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.,
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (No. 08-1008), 2009 WL 2777648, at *1A.
43 For information about legislative activity before 1973, see Marcus, supra note 20, at 610-12, 620.
44 S.3690, 93rd Cong. (1974); H.R. 4270, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 1299, 96th Cong. (1979);
H.R. 3553, 96th Cong. (1979).
45 H.R. 7683, 95th Cong. (1977).
46 S. 3475, 95th Cong. (1978). In floor remarks, both Senators indicated that the bill was
intended to start a conversation, and that they were not wedded to its provisions. See 124 CONG.
REC. 27,859 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (“While this bill was prepared in consultation
with a wide variety of interests, it is only a first step, not the last. Neither Senator Kennedy nor I
are wedded to its provisions.”); id. at 27,869 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“This comprehensive bill
. . .will begin the debate on revision of one of our most important procedural rules [23(b)(3)].”). For
contemporaneous commentary, see James R. Lyons, Jr., Manageability of Class Actions Under S. 3475:
Congress Confronts the Policy Choices Revealed in Rule 23(b)(3) Litigation, 68 KY. L.J. 216 (1980).
47 124 CONG. REC. 27,860 (1978).
48 Id.; see also David Freeman Engstrom, Jacobins at Justice: The (Failed) Revolution of 1978, Class
Action Reform, and the Puzzle of American Procedural Political Economy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1531, 1537
(2017) (“Indeed, lurking in the background of the story of 1978 is the bracing possibility that the
Rules Enabling Act, for all its virtues…has been a systematically enervating force…in an
increasingly dense and interconnected regulatory world.”).
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United States),49 and restructured large-claims class (“compensatory”)
actions50 to “increase the fairness of the procedure and to make it less
expensive and time consuming.”51 The commentary asserted that the “use of
the Rule 23(b)(3) compensation-oriented procedures for actions brought to
remedy pervasive small harm has posed major problems for plaintiffs,
defendants[,] and the courts.”52 The bill thus sought to respond to problems
created by Rule 23 and Supreme Court decisions interpreting it (in particular
those concerning notice), for plaintiffs and the federal courts, as well for
defendants.53 A revised bill was introduced in the House in 1979.54
Nothing came of this legislative initiative.55 The Carter Administration’s
proposal is notable precisely because it was led by Democrats. As we discuss
below, in the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a modest volume of bill
activity seeking to limit class actions, and support for the bills was higher
among Democrats. One possible interpretation of this finding is that, once
the catalytic regulatory potential of amended Rule 23 became clear,
Democrats—the primary architects of the Litigation State—took the lead in
attending to its supervision and calibration prior to the emergence of the
counterrevolution. This is consistent with our conclusion, after examining a
larger universe of bills, that litigation retrenchment did not become a
distinctively Republican issue until the first Reagan Administration.56

49 See S. 3475, 95th Cong. §§ 3001–07 (1978). The proposal “categorically excluded smaller-damages
class actions beyond federal commercial statutes and, further, left no hook for diversity-based class
actions at all.” Engstrom, supra note 48, at 1551.
50 See S. 3475, 95th Cong. §§ 3011–14.
51 124 CONG. REC. 27,859 (1978); see Burbank & Wolff, supra note 19, at 58-59 (“The proposal
suggests . . . restructuring class actions involving larger damages claims to improve efficiency and
fairness of administration without sacrificing individual compensation.”).
52 124 CONG. REC. 27,861 (1978).
53 As discussed in the bill’s commentary:

The present notice requirement of Rule 23(c)(2) and certification prerequisites of Rule
23(b)(3) are designed for actions brought predominantly for compensatory, rather than
deterrent purposes. The burden of these requirements can thwart entirely the
maintenance of an action where the individual injury is small, even though the case
may be meritorious and the harm widespread.
124 CONG. REC. 27,861 (1978).
54 H.R. 5103, 96th Cong. (1979).
55 For other Carter Administration civil litigation reform initiatives, see Stephen C. Yeazell,
Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60
UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1774-75 (2013), finding that “nothing happened, and no subsequent Democrat
has taken up that banner . . . .”
56 See Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1558 (“[W]hen Reagan took office, there emerged a
partisan gap which grew until it peaked in the 105th Congress (1995-1996), with Republicans
supporting anti-litigation proposals at a level about 563% above Democrats.”).

2017] Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation

1507

In order to map legislative activity for class action retrenchment and its
partisan configuration, we identified all bills that sought to amend federal law
so as to restrict opportunities and incentives for class actions. Our search
captured sixty-eight bills from 1973 to 2014. The bills had an average of about
22 co-sponsors, yielding a total of 1511 episodes of legislators sponsoring or
co-sponsoring a bill with a provision seeking to limit class actions. The top
panel of Figure 1 represents a count, per Congress, of episodes of legislators
sponsoring or co-sponsoring anti–class action provisions. The first year of
each Congress is indicated on the horizontal axis. Prior to the 102nd Congress
(1991–1992), the level of bill activity was modest. After the 102nd Congress,
it grew steeply for six years, peaking in the 105th Congress (1997–1998), and
then declined to the point that by the 112th and 113th Congresses (2011–2014),
support levels approached zero, as in most Congresses prior to 1991.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 represents the net partisan balance of support,
which is the total number of Democratic sponsors or co-sponsors in each
Congress minus the total number of Republicans. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, when there was a modest volume of bill activity, the balance was
moderately on the Democratic side. Beginning in the 102nd Congress (1991–92),
the partisan balance shifted to the Republican side. It grew materially in that
direction until the 105th Congress (1997–1998), after which it went into decline.
By about the 110th Congress (2007–2008) the issue had receded from the
legislative agenda and ceased to have discernable partisan valence.
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Figure 1: Total Support for Class Action Retrenchment
and Partisan Balance of Support

In order to analyze the relationship between legislators’ ideology and the
likelihood that they would support anti-class action provisions, we constructed
the following dataset. Separately for each legislator who served in Congress
from 1973 to 2014, we calculated the total number of episodes of sponsorship or
co-sponsorship per Congress.57 We run negative binomial count models on this
dependent variable. In our key independent variable of political party,

57 We include both sponsors and co-sponsors because we are interested in the degree of
legislative support for class action retrenchment proposals. To neglect co-sponsors would be to treat
a bill that a legislator introduces only for herself as equivalent to one that dozens of other members
of Congress support.
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Democrats are coded 0 and Republicans are coded 1. We employ Congressfixed effects with standard errors clustered on legislator.58
In Table 1, we present three models estimating the effects of legislator party
on support for anti–class action provisions: one covering the full period, one
covering 1973 to 1990, and one covering 1991–2014. In the model over the full
period, there is a statistically significant party effect. Moving from Democrat
to Republican is associated with a 189 percent increase in episodes of support
for anti-class action provisions. Subsetting the data into the two time periods
makes clear that the effect is driven by the post-1990 period. In the 1973–1990
model, the coefficient is significant at .1 and negative, indicating that support
by Democrats was 139 percent higher than by Republicans. Recall, however,
that during this period, aggregate levels of bill activity were very low. In the
1991–2014 period, where the vast bulk of bill activity lies, the coefficient turns
positive and becomes highly statistically significant, indicating that moving
from Democrat to Republican is associated with a 206 percent increase in the
predicted count of episodes of support for anti-class action provisions.59
Table 1: Legislator Support for Anti–Class Action Provisions
with Congress-Fixed Effects, 1973–2014

Party

1973–2014

1973–1990

1991–2014

Coef.

Coef.

Marginal
Effect

Coef.

-.87*
(.47)

-139%

1.12*** 206%
(.08)

Marginal
Effect

1.06*** 189%
(.07)

Marginal
Effect

(Congress-fixed effects not displayed)
N=
Adj. Dev. R2=

11344
.51

4847
.25

6497
.41

***.01; **<.05; *<.1; Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on legislator
58 Congress-fixed effects control for factors including the political and public salience of the
class action issue, the lobbying priorities of business and state governments that may wish to reduce
enforcement pressures associated with class actions, and election cycles. This approach leverages
only variation in the relationship between legislators’ party and their votes within (and not across)
Congresses to estimate the effects of party.
59 Ordinary least squares regression models yield similar results. For an explanation of
Ordinary Least-Squares Regression, see generally GRAEME D. HUTCHESON & NICK SOFRONIOU,
THE MULTIVARIATE SOCIAL SCIENTIST: INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS USING GENERALIZED
LINEAR MODELS 56-113 (1999).
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Much of the legislative activity concerning class actions from the 102nd
Congress (1991–1992) through the 109th Congress (2005–2006) was due to
Republican-sponsored bills that ultimately led to enacted statutes: the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199560 (“PSLRA”), and the Class Action
Fairness Act of 200561 (“CAFA”), only the first of which directly affected
federal rights, with the second governing class actions brought under state
law. Yet, among all of the bills captured in our data for the larger project,
these statutes (together with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 199662)
were among a handful of consequential successes in the long-running
legislative campaign for retrenchment of private enforcement of federal
rights. Moreover, they were enacted after years of effort, attracting filibusters
and presidential vetoes.
The limits on class actions that emerged from this legislative gauntlet in
the PSLRA, we believe, are fairly characterized as modest because they do
not challenge the core role of class actions in securities litigation, and they
address class actions in only that one substantive context.63 Ironically,
congressional compromises on such matters as the fraud-on-the-market
theory that were necessary to enact the legislation reduced the scope for the
Supreme Court to raise other enforcement barriers in that context.64

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737.
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
Pub. L. No. 104-140, 110 Stat. 1327.
As John Coffee characterizes the changes effected by the law: “Essentially, it immunized
‘forward-looking statements,’ gave presumptive control of the class action to a ‘lead plaintiff ’ who
had suffered the largest loss (which effectively meant that control went to the largest institutional
investor to volunteer for the role), and imposed stricter pleading rules.” COFFEE, supra note 26, at
125-26. Coffee concludes that “[d]espite predictions that the PSLRA would be the death knell for
securities class actions, not that much has actually changed.” Id. For a discussion of the 1998
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), see id. at 126.
64 See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1201 (2013) (“Because
Congress has homed in on the precise policy concerns raised in Amgen’s brief, we do not think it
appropriate for the judiciary to make its own further adjustments by reinterpreting Rule 23 to make
likely success on the merits essential to class certification in securities-fraud suits.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
John Coffee notes that “several recent Supreme Court decisions have declined the opportunity
to cut back drastically on the class action.” COFFEE, supra note 26, at 132. Two of the three decisions
he mentions in support of that proposition were securities class actions. Id. at 268 n. 22.
For the view that the Court and Congress are engaged in a “lawmaking partnership” in the area
of federal securities fraud litigation, see generally Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as
a Lawmaking Partnership, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 453 (2015). For deletion of a provision in the PSLRA
that would have eliminated the fraud-on-the-market theory, see id. at 456 n. 22. Professor Fisch
posits “three distinctive features,” each of which she regards as “a necessary component of a
lawmaking partnership.” Id. at 469. The third such feature, “a common set of policy objectives”
appears to be vulnerable to ideological polarization on the Court. Id. at 470.
60
61
62
63
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The last observation helps to understand the strategy of those proponents
of CAFA whose actual agenda, in vastly expanding the jurisdiction of federal
courts to hear state law claims brought as class actions, was to ensure that the
cases were not certified and went away.65 In contrast to the PSLRA, where
class action retrenchment required legislative compromise that limited its
reach in later court decisions, CAFA channeled class actions into the federal
courts, an institutional environment in which more aggressive retrenchment
was possible under a transsubstantive Federal Rule. The move from state to
federal court meant that class certification decisions would be governed not
by autonomous and potentially liberal state class action doctrine, but by an
ever-more-conservative federal class action jurisprudence. Moreover, the
growing volume of state law class actions in federal court provided more and
more varied opportunities for federal courts to develop that jurisprudence.
Finally, because Federal Rules apply across substantive claims, increasingly
anti-class action doctrine developed in state law cases also governs
enforcement of federal rights.
CAFA showed how useful “procedural” legislation could be to furthering
the strategy, traceable to the Reagan Administration, of laying the foundation
to retrench private enforcement by empowering federal courts to accomplish
what could not be effectuated in other, more democratic, institutional sites.66
No wonder that episodes of legislators’ support for class action retrenchment
bills declined from 135 in the 109th Congress (2005–2006) to 19 in the 110th
Congress (2007–2008), to 8 in the 111th (2009–2010), to 1 per Congress in the
last two Congresses.67 The counterrevolution had been put in the hands of
those best equipped institutionally to achieve its goals.
III. THE RULEMAKERS’ RESPONSE
The Advisory Committee that drafted the 1966 amendments to Rule 23
was composed primarily of practitioners and academics, with very few judges
(and those judges were equally balanced between Democratic and Republican
appointments).68 It operated under a charge from the Chief Justice of the
United States, Earl Warren, who appointed the members. The Chief Justice
told the reconstituted Advisory Committee in 1960 that, in the Court’s view,
the Federal Rules were operating well and that he did not “expect great

65 See Burbank, supra note 42, at 1942-43.
66 See Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 35, 63 (1993) (“The Reagan [A]dministration sought to achieve its social agenda

primarily by staffing the justice department and judiciary with movement conservatives.”).
67 See supra fig.1.
68 See Rulemaking, supra note 5, at 1566-67.
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changes,” but rather regular updating.69 Yet, it is hard to so regard the 1966
Rule 23 amendments, as it is other amendments proposed by the Committee
in the 1960s. Moreover, as a whole, the work-product of the Advisory
Committee during that decade, which comprised thirty-one percent of all
proposals sent forward over the period from 1960 to 2014, was decidedly proprivate enforcement (pro-plaintiff).70
In 1971, a new Chief Justice, Warren Burger, charged a reconstituted
Advisory Committee, which had a very different composition, in very
different terms.71 Burger told this group, which was dominated by judges, that
there was a need for “major changes in the way in which litigation is being
handled.”72 Instead, during the 1970s, the Advisory Committee made few
recommendations, none of them remotely approaching the salience for
private enforcement of their immediate predecessors’ work.73 They thus
temporarily frustrated Burger’s hope to use court rulemaking as an
instrument of litigation retrenchment.
A number of influences contributed to the Advisory Committee’s meager
output during the 1970s, starting with their decision to spend more than six
years studying class actions.74 Whether the Advisory Committee was following
the Chief Justice’s lead,75 their 1971 decision to revisit class actions is additional

Id. at 1565-66.
See id. at 1578-79; BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 65-130.
See Rulemaking, supra note 5 at 1580-81. Of the new Committee’s sixteen members, eleven
(69%) were judges, and five (31%) were practitioners; there were no academic members. Id. at 1581.
72 According to the minutes of the meeting:
69
70
71

He noted certain expressions of dissatisfaction with a number of specific procedural
devices and suggestions for improvement. But he emphasized the need, not simply for
the betterment of existing procedures, but for major changes in the way in which
litigation is being handled. He advised the Committee that it was unique in that it
could make recommendations in any area of civil litigation where it considered change
desirable.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Held on Sept. 21, 1971, Washington,
D.C. 1 (Sept. 21, 1971) [hereinafter 1971 Minutes], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
fr_import/CV09-1971-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9T6-KJAK].
73 See Rulemaking, supra note 5, at 1582 (“The Advisory Committee sent forward to the Standing
Committee only fourteen proposals for amendments (at the rule level) . . . . Moreover, we
determined that only two proposals for amendments were salient to the issue of private enforcement,
and both of those proposals were pro-enforcement.”).
74 At its first meeting in 1971, “the Committee requested the reporter to undertake a study of
the desirability of effecting changes in” Rule 23 (Class Actions) and Rule 16 (Pre-Trial Procedure).
1971 Minutes, supra note 72, at 2.
75 We think it probable that the Chief Justice stimulated this interest in Rule 23—that it was one
of the “specific procedural devices” about which he “noted certain expressions of dissatisfaction” at the
Committee’s first meeting in 1971. Id. at 1. It was not, in any event, one of the subjects that received
attention from the Special Advisory Group that he had appointed, the report of which the Advisory
Committee considered at that first meeting. Rulemaking, supra note 5, at 1580-81 n.67, 1582-83.
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evidence that the revolutionary potential of the 1966 amendments was quickly
recognized. The decision may also signal recognition that those amendments
were the product of a flawed process—conceived at a time when the Advisory
Committee met in private, distributed proposals for comment to a relatively
limited group, did not make written comments available to the public, and did
not hold public hearings. From that perspective, the Advisory Committee
charged by Burger may have been attempting to supplement the record in areas
where knowledge was thin before proposing further action on Rule 23.76
An additional reason to proceed cautiously emerged during the course of
the Advisory Committee’s study of class actions.77 A core limitation that the
Rules Enabling Act imposes is that Federal Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.”78 It was a serious question whether material
amendments to Rule 23 would do so. The Enabling Act difficulties implicated
in consequential class action reform would likely have become apparent by
reason of the contemporaneously unfolding controversy surrounding the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.79 These difficulties became even harder
to miss in the Spring of 1977 when Justice Department officials briefed the
Advisory Committee on legislative proposals to amend Rule 23.80 As noted
in Section II, the Justice Department subsequently posited “serious questions
as to whether such revision is appropriately within the scope of the rulemaking authority granted by the Rules Enabling Act” when sponsoring
legislation to replace Rule 23(b)(3).81 No such legislation was enacted, but
after it was introduced, class action reform disappeared from the Advisory
Committee’s agenda for more than a decade.
76 Thus, although saddled with the same cloistered process, the Advisory Committee sent a
survey to federal judges, in response to which “50 percent of 145 district judges indicated that they
favored prompt amendment of rule 23.” 124 CONG. REC. 27,860 (1978).
77 There is a big gap in the public record of Advisory Committee minutes during this period.
As a result, with respect to the period between September 1971 and May 1977, our assessment is
based on the reports of the Standing Committee to the Judicial Conference. See REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 6 (Sept. 1973), http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-1973.pdf [https://perma.cc/R653-Z7WH].
78 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
79 In 1973 Congress, for the first time since passage of the Rules Enabling Act in 1934, blocked
proposed Federal Rules transmitted by the Supreme Court, treating them as proposals for legislation
and, after making numerous changes, enacting them as a statute. See Stephen B. Burbank: Procedure,
Politics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1695-96 (2004). One reason for
doing so was the belief that some of the proposed rules usurped congressional prerogatives. Id. at 1696.
80 See Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Minutes of the May 23, 1977 Meeting 2-3,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-civilprocedure-may-1977 [https://perma.cc/AP7K-TH8Y] (“Mr. Berry [of the Justice Department’s
Office for Improvement in the Administration of Justice] briefed the committee members on the
function of his office with regard to Rule 23,” noting that his office’s priority was “magistrates reform
and the second, class action reform”).
81 124 CONG. REC. 27,860 (1978); see also supra text accompanying note 48.
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A final reason that may explain why the 1970s Advisory Committee
proceeded carefully with class action reform is that the Committee was not
ideally composed to respond favorably to calls for major litigation retrenchment
from organized bar groups or to pressure from the Chief Justice. For most of
the decade judge-members who had been appointed by Democratic presidents,
although in the minority, had substantial representation. A material imbalance
arose (through attrition) only in the last two years.82
By the time the Advisory Committee next took up possible amendments
to Rule 23—in the early 1990s83—the balance of power on the Committee had
tilted more sharply in favor of judges appointed by Republican presidents
and of corporate practitioners.84 There were, however, other obstacles to
using rulemaking for class action retrenchment that had not impeded the proaccess 1966 amendments. Primary among them were changes to the Enabling
Act process resulting from discontents that surfaced in the 1970s after the
Federal Rules of Evidence imbroglio and intensified in the 1980s when the
Advisory Committee, urged on by Burger, aggressively pursued measures
that many deemed inimical to private enforcement.
These process changes, requiring more opportunities for public participation
in rulemaking, greater transparency, and more time for Congress to consider
proposed amendments, functioned as a control technique. Some proponents of
the changes apparently hoped to entrench the pro-access status quo by making
the rulemaking process stickier and empowering interest groups to monitor
proposals and sound an alarm in the event of perceived overreaching.85
In part for that reason and in part because of the qualities of those
leading the effort, the approach taken to the consideration of class action
reform in the 1990s could not have been more different from that taken in
See Rulemaking, supra note 5, at 1584-85.
For a discussion of the Committee’s 1982 decision “to do nothing,” see Marcus, supra note
20, at 645.
84 See Rulemaking, supra note 5, at 1591; see also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 65-130.
85 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 Stat.
4642, 4649 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(2), (d) (2012)) (requiring rulemaking
bodies to provide notice of open meetings on proposed rules); Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1594
(discussing the required open meetings in the 1988 amendments). Even before the changes in the
1980s, the Enabling Act process held the potential for stickiness once drafting responsibility was
committed to the Judicial Conference in 1958, and the Conference chose to operate through a multistage review process. See Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (1958); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE REGULAR ANNUAL MEETING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
6-7 (Sept. 1958), http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/reports-proceedings-1950s [https://
perma.cc/36B7-955X]. The potential for stickiness expands or contracts depending on the degree of
deference shown to the Advisory Committee, which in turn is in part a function of the degree of
control the Standing Committee exercises. In that regard, however, it is worthwhile recalling that
the Chief Justice not only appoints all members of both committees, but also presides at the next
two stages of review within the judiciary—the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court.
82
83
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the 1960s. In a series of meetings and conferences, the Advisory Committee
sought information from expert practitioners, judges, and academics, and it
initiated empirical work by the Federal Judicial Center. It then published
proposed amendments for comment and held extensive public hearings.86
At the end of the day, the Committee concluded that significant change to
Rule 23 was so freighted with controversy among interest groups, and so
problematic under the Enabling Act, that it should not be attempted by
rulemaking.87 The changes the Committee recommended instead, which
went into effect in 1998 and 2003, were far more restrained than champions
of class action retrenchment advocated, and they avoided the core elements
of the rule.88
Ironically, however, Rule 23 amendments that seemed modest at the
time have facilitated major changes in class action jurisprudence through
court decisions. The most obvious and important example is the 1998
amendment adding Rule 23(f).89 Facially neutral as between plaintiffs and
defendants, this amendment permits courts of appeals in their discretion to
entertain immediate appeals from class-certification decisions.90 It has
enabled and highlighted another path to retrenchment of private
enforcement by substantially expanding the opportunities for conservative
federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, to control the course
of class-action jurisprudence. This suggests that, even in the domain of
rulemaking, some consequential reforms can fly under the radar screen. As

86 “Proposed Rule 23 amendments were published in August, 1996, for comment. The volume of
written comments, statements, and testimony was impressive. All have been collected in a four-volume
set of materials.” Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. Meeting Held on May 1-2, 1997 4 (May 12, 1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/cv5-97.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3H8-C78S].
87 See Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. Meeting Held on Apr. 10 & 11, 2000 30
(Apr. 10-11, 2000), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/400minCV.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HME8-SMEZ]; Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. Meeting Held on Nov. 12
& 13, 1998 8 (Nov. 12-13, 1998), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV1198.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QC23-X2DV].
88 See Mark R. Kravitz, David F. Levi, Lee H. Rosenthal & Anthony J. Scirica, They Were
Meant for Each Other: Professor Edward Cooper and The Rules Enabling Act, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
495, 518-19 (2013).
89 Less obvious are 2003 amendments that, together with the accompanying Advisory
Committee Note, courts have been able to leverage in influential decisions that have made class
certification more difficult. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318-19
(3rd Cir. 2008) (relying on advisory committee notes to the 2003 amendments in vacating a class
certification order). The author of the opinion in this case, Judge Scirica, was a major player in
rulemaking concerning Rule 23 in the 1990s and 2000s.
90 A similar mechanism was part of the Carter Administration’s proposed statute replacing
Rule 23(b)(3). See S. 3475, 95th Cong. § 4 (1978) (“The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction to
review in their discretion orders of the district courts dismissing or allowing actions to be maintained
as public actions or class compensatory actions.”); 124 CONG. REC. 27,866 (1978) (noting that the
statute allows either party to appeal the allowance or denial of class certification).
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previously noted and as elaborated in Section V, we argue that a similar
phenomenon has been an important reason for the Supreme Court’s success
in furthering the goals of the counterrevolution through decisions on issues
salient to private enforcement.
The Advisory Committee began considering whether additional Rule 23
amendments would be useful and feasible in 2011. A preliminary report by
a subcommittee charged with that inquiry made clear that the effort was
proceeding with the care and broad outreach of the 1990s class action
initiative.91 The topics under discussion included a number that were likely
to engage ideological commitments, such as issue classes,92 as well as topics
on which the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is widely questioned, such as
settlement classes.93 At the end of the day, the Committee recommended
for publication proposed amendments to Rule 23 addressing three principal
topics: (1) “the process of settling class actions,” (2) “the core considerations
that should inform the court’s review of a proposed settlement,” and (3) “the
handling of class member objections to proposed settlements.”94 The
proposals again avoided core issues, although the Committee approved the
subcommittee’s recommendation that “two topics remain under study.”95
Those topics are so-called “pick-off issues” remaining after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,96 and the extent to which
the members of a putative class must be ascertainable in order for the class
to be certified.97
In deciding not to pursue topics such as issue classes and the
requirements for certification of settlement classes, the rulemakers have
again acknowledged the roadblocks to major class action retrenchment
under the Enabling Act, particularly as amended in 1988. In explaining why
they carved out topics for further study, they may also have implicitly
acknowledged a new roadblock: having tasted the retrenchment potential of
amending Rule 23 (and some other Federal Rules) under the cloak of

91 See RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 24399 (Apr. 9-10, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV2015-04.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4WST-MQQF].
92 Id. at 39-41.
93 Id. at 11-20.
94 Excerpt of Memorandum from Hon. John D. Bates, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules,
to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 193-94 (May 12, 2016,
revised July 1, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-08-preliminary_draft_of_
rules_forms_published_for_public_comment_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF6E-P4WC] [hereinafter
Bates Memorandum].
95 Id.
96 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
97 See Bates Memorandum, supra note 94, at 194-95.
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interpretation,98 the Court may not be keen to surrender its position as the
vanguard of the counterrevolution—its hammer—to which we now turn.99
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S RESPONSE
As the previous sections document, the course of the counterrevolution
against the modern class action in the elected branches and in rulemaking
under the Enabling Act has been similar to its course in the larger domain
of legal issues relevant to private enforcement that we have studied. None
of those institutions was very successful in changing the salient legal rules.
In our other work we have found that, by contrast, the Supreme Court
acting as such (rather than as promulgator of the Federal Rules) has been
increasingly successful—and increasingly polarized—in retrenching rules
salient to private enforcement, and we have explored institutional
explanations for its relative success both theoretically and empirically.100 It
remains to consider whether the pattern holds as to class actions.
To set the stage, we present some of our findings on the Court’s
decisions in one of the larger domains we have examined. Our collection of
Supreme Court data includes identification of all cases from 1960 to 2014
in which the Supreme Court decided an issue that turned on interpretation
of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, where the result would either widen
or narrow opportunities or incentives for private enforcement. Because we
are particularly interested in class actions, we also included in our Federal
Rules cases those that turned on an issue explicitly linked to the policies
underpinning Rule 23, such as tolling a statute of limitations and claim
preclusion. The search yielded 78 cases, containing 80 issues, and 693 Justice
votes. The cases span 1961 to 2013 because none was decided in 1960 or 2014.
We find that, beginning around the early 1980s, there was a long decline
in the probability of a pro-private enforcement vote. At the time this
decline began, liberal and conservative Justices were fairly close together on
Federal Rules private enforcement issues. However, there developed
growing distance between liberal and conservative Justices, with escalating
polarization after around 2000. We also find that Federal Rules private
enforcement cases (much more so than other private enforcement cases) are
dominated by business defendants and that this business-defendant skew grew
98 See Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1603-06 (describing the Court’s ability to “bring about
momentous civil litigation reform that would be impossible to secure from the legislature or its
delegated procedural lawmaking bodies”); see also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 65-130.
99 Of course, Justice Scalia’s death and Justice Gorsuch’s appointment render this doubly speculative.
100 See Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1580-82; Subterranean Counterrevolution, supra note 5,
at 299-300; see also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 130-248.
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starker after about 2000. Since about the same time, the Court has devoted
materially more attention to Federal Rules private enforcement issues on its
docket, and those cases have elicited dissents at increasingly and notably high
rates. In the past fifteen years, plaintiffs are losing, and business defendants are
winning, a huge majority of Federal Rules private enforcement cases, and this
field is the locus of increasingly intense conflict among the Justices.
Finally, by way of background, we estimated the effect of ideology on the
Justices’ votes in Federal Rules cases. In the roughly two decades from 1995 to
2013, the reduction in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote
associated with moving from a liberal to a conservative Justice is sixty percent
(we describe the liberal–conservative dichotomy below). Remarkably, in the
1995–2013 period, the effect of ideology on these procedure votes about tripled
relative to the 1961–1994 period. It went from notably less than the effect
observed when all private enforcement cases are pooled, in all federal rights
issues, and in merits votes in policy areas underlying our private enforcement
data, to being larger than all of them.101
To investigate these issues in class action cases, we examined all cases from
1969 (the year of the first case decided after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23)
to 2014 that turned on either an interpretation of Rule 23 or an issue explicitly
linked to policies underpinning Rule 23. Our search yielded thirty-three cases,
in which thirty-four discrete class action issues were decided. We treat the issue
as the unit of analysis. This rendered a total of 291 Justice votes on class-action
issues. This, of course, provides modest data for discussion and analysis. But,
because this is the full universe, we find it informative to examine empirically.
Our primary interest is to assess the relationship between the Justices’
ideological preferences and their votes in class action cases, and whether and
how this has changed over time. For our primary measure of Justice ideology,
we rely on Martin–Quinn scores, which are based on Justices’ voting behavior
in all non-unanimous cases.102 Use of these scores allows us to assess empirically
whether class actions belong in the family of issues associated with the left–
right divide, such as civil rights and economic regulation.
Table 2 lists the raw proportion of pro–class action votes, relative to total
votes, for each Justice who voted in more than five cases in our data. Two things
stand out. First, the distribution from lowest to highest pro–class action votes
roughly tracks the conservative–liberal dimension. The table also indicates
whether a Justice is “conservative” (=1) or “liberal” (=0), dividing them
according to whether they are above or below the median of the average annual
See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 130-92.
These “ideal point” scores are fluid, changing from one term to the next in accordance with
changes in Justices’ voting behavior over time. Higher values are associated with more conservative
Justices.
101
102

2017] Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation

1519

Martin–Quinn score for Justices in our class action data who voted in more
than five cases.103 Every “conservative” has a lower pro-class action voting rate
than every “liberal.” A second notable feature of the table is the large disparity
between conservative and liberal Justices’ voting ratios. The scale ranges from
Kennedy and Thomas voting in a pro-class action direction 17 and 18% of the
time, to Sotomayor/Kagan and Douglas doing so 83 and 100% of the time.
Table 2: Percent Pro–Class Action Votes
Justice

% Pro–Class
Action

Number of
Issues

Conservative

Avg.
Martin–
Quinn Score

Kennedy
Thomas
Scalia
Alito
Powell
Stewart
Roberts
Burger
White
Rehnquist
O’Connor
Blackmun
Ginsburg
Marshall
Brennan
Stevens
Breyer
Sotomayor
Kagan
Douglas

17
18
25
25
32
33
38
40
41
42
57
59
64
65
68
72
82
83
83
100

12
11
12
8
19
18
8
20
22
24
7
22
11
23
22
18
11
6
6
7

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

.48
3.36
2.30
2.10
.89
.53
1.19
1.75
.39
3.78
1.09
.19
-2.09
-2.85
-2.66
-1.16
-1.39
-1.88
-1.61
-6.58

103

data set.

The average score is computed using Justice scores for all years appearing in our class action
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Figure 2 presents the raw number of pro– and anti–class action outcomes
in each year. In years with no value reflected on the figure, no class action issues
were decided. From 1969 (when the first case in our data appears) through the
end of the 1970s, the clear preponderance of outcomes was anti–class action,
with all but one of these cases decided after 1972, when conservative Justices
secured a majority. In the 1980s, the clear preponderance was pro–class action.
Only one class action issue was decided from 1989 to 1996 (in 1991). From 1997
to 2014, the balance was anti-class action.
Figure 2: Net Balance of Outcomes in Class Action Cases

Figure 3 reflects regression estimates of the probability of an outcome in
favor of class actions and the separate probabilities of conservative and liberal
Justices’ votes in favor of class actions. Our purpose in presenting the figure
is to convey a broad descriptive sense of longitudinal patterns in the data, and
we will rely on statistical models below to evaluate the significance and size
of the effects of ideology on Justice votes in different time periods. The figure
reflects that the estimated probability of a pro-class action outcome declined
from about 62% in the late 1980s through 1991, to 36% in 2013. Viewing the
smoothed estimates alongside Figure 2 makes clear that the decline is driven
by cases decided from 1997 to 2013.
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Figure 3: Probability of Pro-Private Enforcement Outcomes
and Justice Votes in Class Action Cases

This decline has been substantially driven by the votes of conservative
Justices, whose estimated probability of a pro–class action vote fell from an
average of 42 percent in the 1980s to 22 percent in 2013. The estimated
probability of a pro-class action vote increased for liberal Justices over the same
period, from an average of 68 percent in the 1980s to 84 percent at the end of
the series. Thus, the difference, or the ideological distance, between liberal and
conservative Justices’ voting on class action issues grew significantly over time.
From an average of about 25 percentage points in the 1980s, it grew to 62
percentage points by the end of the series. It is evident that all of the long-run
changes described in this paragraph were driven by cases decided in the 1997–
2013 period.
Scholars have made similar findings concerning the Court’s business
decisions, and a similar phenomenon may explain both these trends: “[T]he
increasing conservatism of the Court resulted in the Court’s taking cases in which
the conservative position was weaker than previously, leading to more opposition
by liberal Justices and hence to a higher percentage of liberal votes by those
Justices in business cases.”104 This explanation is consistent with our sense, after
reading all decisions in the database, that the growing distance we find in the
104 Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1470 (2013).
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1997-2013 period in quantitative analysis reflects increasingly assertive efforts to
move the law governing class actions in a conservative direction.105 It is
interesting that conflict among the Justices over class actions is at its highest point
ever, while simultaneously disappearing from Congress’ agenda.
Some of the Court’s decisions in this period have changed or destabilized
class action law to the detriment of plaintiffs/private enforcement. Thus,
Amchem and Ortiz effectively ended mass tort class actions,106 while the Court
in Wal-Mart not only (unanimously) foreclosed almost all monetary recovery
in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, but also (5-4) appeared to change the longaccepted, and easy to satisfy, interpretation of the commonality requirement
for certification under Rule 23(a)(2).107 It may be that the adverse impact of
the Court’s commonality holding is effectively limited to Title VII and similar
cases, but it was so written as to spawn uncertainty (and additional litigation)
in the lower courts.108 The same is true of Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,109 an
antitrust case in which (b)(3) class certification foundered on proof of
damages and the attempted extension of which by class action opponents may
be, as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent suggested, wishful thinking.110 There can be
no doubt, however, that litigants promoting class action retrenchment have
sought to press the envelope or that the Court’s conservative majority has

105 Another possible explanation is that it took the Court’s liberals time to realize either that a
counterrevolution was in progress, or just how committed some of their colleagues were to it. See
Litigation Reform, supra note 5, at 1610 n.255 (suggesting that “it took time for some of the Court’s
liberals to realize what was going on”).
106 See David Marcus, The Short Life and Long Afterlife of the Mass Tort Class Action, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 1565, 1588 (2017) (“[The Amchem Court] hammered the penultimate nail in the mass tort
class action’s coffin.”).
107 Wal-Mart, v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011); see also COFFEE, supra note 26, at 128
(observing with respect to 23(a)(2) that the Court “rewrote that standard fundamentally”).
108 See Richard Marcus, Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in the Twenty-First Century,
65 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 505-07, 512-13 (2016) (“[I]t can be debated whether Wal-Mart has major
significance for class actions outside the employment discrimination sphere.”).
109 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
110 Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s ruling is good for this day and case only.
In the mine run of cases, it remains the ‘black letter rule’ that a class may obtain certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) when liability questions common to the class predominate over damages questions
unique to class members.”); see also Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[T]he [Comcast] Court did not hold that proponents of class certification must rely upon a
classwide damages model to demonstrate predominance.”); Marcus, supra note 108, at 512-16 (“[T]he
dissent by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer seemed to belittle the decision as insignificant, asserting
that the decision ‘breaks no new ground on the standard for certifying a class action,’ and that it ‘is
good for this day and case only.’ Almost from the outset, there was vigorous public disagreement
about whether the Court had really done anything.” (citation omitted)). Compare COFFEE, supra
note 26, at 130, 132 (discussing Comcast’s impact on antitrust class actions), with id. at 162 (discussing
Comcast’s broader implications).
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been receptive.111 Indeed, two cases involving class arbitration of federal
claims are in our data because the majority’s reasoning reflects, and is suffused
with hostility to, class actions. One of them, American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors, elicited the blunt indictment with which we begin this article.112
When juxtaposed with the legal retrenchment that some of these decisions
have effected, and others may effect, the few decisions in this period that were
favorable to class actions do not appear to balance the scales. Thus, although
we included in that small group the Court’s decision holding that an absent
class member who has objected to a proposed settlement need not intervene
in order to appeal from approval of that settlement,113 there are arguments
for the opposite characterization. This is particularly so when one recognizes
that objectors are not always out to improve the quality of settlements.114 Two
Court decisions, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.115 and Amgen Inc.
v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds,116 exemplify the envelopepressing behavior we referred to above, but they also exemplify the greater
difficulty the Court has retrenching class action law in the securities context,
where Congress has made relevant policy choices, many of them based on
legislative compromise.117 That leaves the Court’s Shady Grove decision,118
where a short-term gain for those seeking to bring state law class actions may
have prevented some Justices from seeing potential long-term losses.119

111 Our data end in 2014. For the argument that a backlash due to repeated overreaching by
business defendants and their interest groups is one possible explanation for recent Supreme Court
decisions that appear less hostile to class actions, see Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A
Respite from The Decline, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2017).
112 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666, 686-87 (2010) (finding that “imposing class arbitration on parties whose
arbitration clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue” violated the Federal Arbitration Act).
113 See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002).
114 Such problems are the focus of current proposed amendments to Rule 23. See supra text
accompanying note 94.
115 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011) (holding that
plaintiffs in private security fraud actions need not prove loss causation to obtain class certification).
116 Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013) (holding that
proof of materiality is not a prerequisite to class certification in securities fraud case).
117 See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. For the view that “stare decisis and congressional
prerogatives are invoked selectively, only when they align with the Court’s own independent
judgments about whether to adopt a class-facilitative substantive rule” in the context of “otherwise
class-restrictive” securities laws, see J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s “Non-Transsubstantive” Class
Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1625, 1644-45 (2017).
118 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
119 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 19, at 76 (“Despite CAFA’s underlying jurisdictional
commitment to combating perverse overenforcement of state liability, Shady Grove subverted New
York’s shield against the overenforcement of state law penalties or minimum damages. But that irony
should not obscure the underlying similarity between CAFA and Shady Grove . . . .” Both have
“deprived the states of power to pursue visions of the class action that differ from the federal vision”).
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We next construct a model using the votes of Justices on class action issues
as the dependent variable and the Justices’ ideology scores as the key
independent variable. In addition to models using Martin–Quinn scores based
on Justices’ voting behavior, we present parallel models using Segal–Cover
scores to measure Justice ideology.120 In addition to the direct incorporation
of the ideology measure into our models, we also assess whether ideology had
a greater effect on Justices’ votes on class action issues after the mid-1990s.
To test this hypothesis, we model the post-1994 effect with a time dummy
variable that takes the value of 0 from 1969 to 1994, and 1 from 1995 to 2013,
interacted with the Justices’ ideology score. The interaction allows us to assess
whether there was a change in the effect of ideology on Justices’ votes on class
action issues after 1994.
We do so for several reasons. First, Republicans took Congress in the 1994
elections and have held at least one chamber almost continuously since,
materially reducing the probability of legislative override. The logic of this
theory is that Justices’ votes may be constrained by the perceived threat of
legislative override, and the diminution of that threat after 1994 may have
widened their perceived range of policymaking discretion.121
Moreover, civil litigation retrenchment in general—and class action
retrenchment in particular—became a more salient issue in the Republican
Party, and the locus of more partisan conflict, playing a notable role in
Gingrich’s “Contract with America” in the 1994 campaign, and in the
Republican anti-litigation legislative program mounted in 1995.122 Indeed,
“Republicans made securities class action reform a centerpiece of their Contract
with America in 1994,”123 and the bill data we presented earlier shows that anticlass action bills introduced by Republicans surged in the early to mid-1990s
(Figure 1), having not previously been the locus of significant bill activity or a
Republican issue. This elevation of class action retrenchment on the
Republican Party agenda corresponded to an increasing focus on class actions
by important advocacy groups associated with the Republican Party, specifically
including business groups and conservative law reform organizations.
A window on this pattern can be found in amicus filings in the thirty of our
thirty-three class action cases that did not also present a merits issue (assuring
120 See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,
83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 (1989) (noting that Segal–Cover scores are based on pre-confirmation
newspaper editorials on the nominations, and thus are independent of Justices’ voting behavior).
121 See Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the Supreme
Court’s Constitutional Rulings, 1987–2000, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533, 545 (2006).
122 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1185
n.533 (2001); Carl Tobias, Reforming Common Sense Legal Reforms, 30 CONN. L. REV. 537, 538 (1998).
123 A.C. Pritchard, Halliburton II: A Loser’s History, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 27,
39 (2015).
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that amicus briefs were addressed to the class action issue). From 1969 through
1994, the Chamber of Commerce did not file an amicus brief in any of twenty
cases, and from 1995 to 2014 they filed amicus briefs in seven of ten cases. When
all business association amicus filings are aggregated, only two briefs were filed
in twenty cases from 1969 to 1994, and twenty-eight briefs were filed in ten cases
from 1995 to 2014. The Chamber’s National Litigation Center has filed amicus
briefs since it was founded in 1977.124 However, the Chamber’s turn to issues of
procedure and court access—as contrasted with regulatory policy—was signaled
by its 1998 founding of the Institute for Legal Reform, which characterizes itself
as “the country’s most influential and successful advocate for civil justice
reform.”125 One of its key targets has been to limit class actions.126 Growth in the
Chamber’s amicus filings in class action cases in the mid-1990s was part of a
wider and concerted campaign of litigation retrenchment.127
Conservative law reform organizations, too, materially elevated their
amicus attention to class action issues in the mid-1990s. Among these groups,
the two that participate most frequently as amicus filers in private enforcement
cases are the Pacific Legal Foundation and the Washington Legal Foundation,
emerging as vocal advocates against class actions.128 Prior to 1995, these
organizations ignored class action issues on the Supreme Court’s docket and
filed no briefs. From 1995 to 2014, they filed seven amicus briefs in ten cases.
The story is similar with defense-side lawyers associations, which filed one brief
in twenty cases from 1969 to 1994, and eight briefs in ten cases from 1995 to
2014. The Defense Research Institute was the most frequent filer among them.
In aggregate, business associations, conservative law reform organizations, and
defense-side lawyers associations filed three briefs in twenty cases from 1969 to
1994 (.15 per case), and fifty-one briefs in ten cases from 1995 to 2014 (5.2 per
case). This amounts to a growth in amicus attention by a factor of thirty-five.
One might be tempted to conclude that this growth in amicus filings merely
reflects a more general growth in amicus filings during the same period.

124 See David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber of
Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1019, 1023 (2009).
125 About ILR, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/about-ilr [https://perma.cc/96QE-99CY].
126 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the
Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 889-90 & n.256 (2014) (describing the Institute’s negative
position on consumer class actions); see also Patrick M. Garry et al., The Irrationality of Shareholder
Class Action Lawsuits: A Proposal for Reform, 49 S.D. L. REV. 275, 275 n.2 (2003–2004) (describing
the Institute’s position on consumer class actions).
127 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 217-48.
128 See Trenton H. Norris & James F. Speyer, Curtailing Class Action Abuse: How Three
Developments Converged To Reduce the Pressure to Settle, 25 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, no. 20, May 21,
2010; ADR Brief, Once Again, The Supreme Court Takes on Class Action Arbitration, 27 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 170, 170-71 (2009).
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However, that would be a mistake. Viewing amicus filings in all cases decided
by the Court, one observes 2.6 briefs per case for the 1970–1994 period, and 8.6
for the 1995–2014 period, which is 3.3 times larger. 129 This rate of growth pales
in comparison to the 35-fold growth in class action amicus filings that we observe
among these groups.
Returning to our empirical models, we additionally control for a number of
other potentially relevant factors: (1) the outcome of the Court of Appeals ruling
below; (2) the presence of a U.S. party advocating a pro– or anti–class action
position; (3) whether the defendant was a government versus a business
defendant, with business defendant as the reference category; (4) whether the
underlying policy area was securities, antitrust, civil rights, other social regulation,
or other economic regulation, with securities left out as the reference category.
Table 3 reports logit models with standard errors clustered on judge.130 The
main effect of the ideology variable in the Martin–Quinn models is significant
with a marginal effect of -.06. Because the interaction is included, this variable
reflects the effect of ideology only in the period from 1969 to 1994. From a
substantive perspective, the distance on the Martin–Quinn scale between the
mean ideology scores of Justices designated conservative and liberal (see Table 2)
is approximately 3.5. An increase of this magnitude in the ideology score is
associated with a 21-percentage point reduction in the probability of a pro-class
action vote. The interaction of ideology with the post-1994 dummy is significant,
with a marginal effect of -.08. The effect of ideology in the post-1994 period is
given by summing the marginal effects of the two variables (-1.4), such that
moving from the average liberal to the average conservative is associated with a
49-percentage point reduction in the probability of a pro-class action vote.
In the Segal–Cover model, the main effect of the ideology variable is again
significant with a marginal effect of .22. The distance on the Segal–Cover scale
between the mean ideology scores of Justices above and below the median score
in the data is approximately .59. In the Segal–Cover measure, larger values are
associated with greater liberalism. A change of this magnitude in the
conservative direction is associated with a 13-percentage point reduction in the
probability of a pro-class action vote. The interaction of ideology with the post1994 dummy is significant, with a marginal effect of .61. In the post-1994
period, moving from the average ideology of Justices on the liberal side of the
Segal–Cover median to the conservative side is associated with a 49-percentage
point reduction in the probability of a pro-class action vote.131

See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 130-92.
The ideology variables (both main effects and interactions) remain statistically significant
in both models in alternative specifications with standard errors clustered on case.
131 Note that because of the interaction set up, the significant main effect of Post-1994 Dummy
reflects the effect when ideology equals zero (the most conservative pole of the Segal-Cover score).
129
130
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Table 3: Logit Model of Justice Votes in Class Action Cases
Martin–Quinn

Ideology
Post-1994 Dummy
Ideology*Post-1994
Dummy
Lower Court Direction
U.S. Pro
U.S. Anti
Business Defendant
Antitrust
Civil Rights
Other Economic
Other Social

Segal–Cover

Coefficient

Marginal

Coefficient

Marginal

-.28***
(.07)
-.27
(.30)
-.37***
(.12)
-.30
(.25)
.25
(.31)
.07
(.66)
.30
(.44)
.93
(.69)
.48
(.43)
.16
(.58)
.42
(.50)

-.06

.95**
(.41)
-1.22***
(.40)
2.66***
(.77)
-.30
(.23)
.11
(.31)
.07
(.67)
.27
(.42)
.91
(.62)
.44
(.41)
.38
(.64)
.37
(.48)

.22

-.08

N=
291
Pseudo R2=
.13
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Justice
***<.01; **<.05; *<.1

-.28
.61

291
.07

The two models, using very different measures of ideology, paint a
consistent picture. Prior to 1995, the effect of ideology on Justices’ votes on
class action issues was significant but relatively modest. In the 1995–2013
period, the effect of ideology became substantively large, more than doubling
by one measure, and more than tripling by another, during which time the
probability of a pro-class action outcome fell materially. Moreover, the
emergence of class action issues as notably ideologically divisive on the Court
followed the emergence of class-action retrenchment by just a few years.

1528

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 1495

Almost overnight, it became a highly visible campaign of the Republican
Party. It also corresponded to the dramatic rise in amicus advocacy in class
action cases by business associations led by the Chamber of Commerce,
conservative law reform organizations, and defense-side lawyers associations.
In our view, the conservative wing of the Court’s turn against class actions in
the past fifteen years must be evaluated in the context of this wider partisan
and interest group attack on class actions.
In presenting these data, we do not suggest that the Court’s class action
decisions reflected exclusively the ideological preferences of the Justices. That
position would neglect “the messiness of lived experience,”132 which teaches
that judges—even judges on a court that has the final (at least within the
judiciary) word on matters of constitutional law—make decisions based on a
number of considerations, including the law as they understand it. One such
consideration, institutional self-interest (concerning the effect of a ruling on
the docket of the federal courts), quite clearly influenced a number of the
Court’s class action decisions, particularly anti-access decisions in the late
1960s and the 1970s.133
CONCLUSION
From an institutional perspective, in recent years the Supreme Court has
led the counterrevolution against class actions just as it has led the
counterrevolution on the other issues salient to private enforcement that we
have studied. Class actions have been the focus of legislative, rulemaking, and
Supreme Court retrenchment efforts. In Congress, primarily Republican
reformers had relatively modest success, focused in a few policy areas. The
rulemakers, disproportionately led by Republican-appointed judges and
corporate practitioners, but constrained in important ways by the Enabling
Act process reforms of the 1980s, fared little better.134 In marked contrast, the
132 Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science, and Humility,
in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT
STAKE 41, 53 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011).
133 See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 349-56 (1978) (holding that a
class representative must pay the cost of identifying absent members to receive notice); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1974) (holding that a class representative must pay the
cost of giving individual notice to all absent members who can be identified through reasonable
effort); Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1974) (requiring all members of class to meet
amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341
(1969) (holding that claims of class members cannot be aggregated to meet the amount in
controversy requirement); id. (“There is no compelling reason for this Court to overturn a settled
interpretation of an important congressional statute in order to add to the burdens of an already
overloaded federal court system.”). For further discussion of several of these decisions, see Marcus,
supra note 20, at 627-29 (discussing Snyder and Zahn); id. at 633-35 (discussing Eisen).
134 As we have stated,
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Supreme Court, led by its conservative wing, has issued a series of decisions
making the governing legal rules more difficult for those seeking private
enforcement through class actions.
The results we report here look quite similar to those on the other issues
we have tracked, particularly the Federal Rules issues (which contributed
some of the data we analyze in this Article). As is true of the Federal Rules
issues, the growing role of ideology is distinctive and palpable. Indeed, the
gap separating liberal and conservative Justices’ votes on class action and
other procedural issues is materially greater than on federal rights in
general.135 As Justice Kagan all but said in the quotation that opens this
Article, class actions have become a magnet for ideological judicial behavior.
One of the cases contributing data for this article, Wal-Mart, garnered a
great deal of attention in the media. This prompted some who commented
on our early work to question a hypothesis we advanced in seeking
institutional explanations for the Supreme Court’s relative success in the
counterrevolution. As we framed that hypothesis more recently:
If, as many scholars believe, the Court’s public standing and legitimacy are
important to its institutional power, the need for broad public support and
concern about negativity bias place some limits on its discretion to scale back
highly visible substantive statutory rights directly. From the standpoint of
legitimacy, the strategy of focusing on lower visibility private enforcement
issues is preferable. When the Court is engaged in apparently technical and
legalistic decisionmaking, the public perceives it as more objective, neutral, and
legitimate. Indeed, the public is less likely to notice such decisions at all.136

Systematic empirical study of how the media covered the issues in our
data as a whole supports this hypothesis: they receive far less coverage than
the underlying merits issues.137 It is possible, however, that class action issues
are different. For the present, we note that, however salient Wal-Mart was to
members of the public, that salience owed little if anything to the issues that

We do not doubt that most of the Advisory Committee’s work is unaffected by
members’ ideological preferences, including in particular the ideological preferences
of members who are judges. As our data confirm, few of the Committee’s proposals
predictably implicate private enforcement, and a great deal of its work does not map
to a left-right ideological dimension. At least since the counterrevolution became a
partisan project in the elected branches, however, we believe that the rulemaking
proposals most likely to elicit ideological behavior are precisely those that will affect
private enforcement.
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 6, at 83.
135 See supra text accompanying note 101.
136 Subterranean Counterrevolution, supra note 5, at 299 (footnotes omitted).
137 See id. at 307-14.
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the Court decided, which were indeed “technical and legalistic.”138 Like most
of the issues in our data, including the data for this article, they were the
kinds of issues that receive little attention from the media and are little
noticed by the public.139

138 Id. at 297.
139 See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV.
LITIG. 313, 325 (2012) (“Wal-Mart v. Dukes involved a massive sex-discrimination class action against

a major nationwide corporation, making it the rare civil procedure case to draw significant scholarly
and mainstream media coverage, which largely focused on its potential effect on substantive
employment discrimination law.”); see also id. at 315-16 (“Of course, having civil procedure on the
doctrinal agenda will not draw the attention or ire of the popular media or the public; do not expect
public calls to impeach Roberts over the scope of Rule 8(a).”).

